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The short message service (SMS) is one of the highly used and well-tried mobile services with global 
availability within all GSM networks. The existing SMS is limited to the transmission of secure plain text 
between different mobile phone subscribers. SMS does not have any built-in procedure to authenticate 
the text and offer security for the text transmitted as data, because most of the applications for mobile 
devices are designed and developed without taking security into consideration. This paper details an 
overview of the current SMS security aspects and concerns during the SMS transmission. It also 
chronologically presents the existing mechanisms used to protect the SMS with the goal to provide 
useful advices for further research. In addition, the security and efficiency of these mechanisms are 
analysed, considering the limitation on the mobile devices and the security requirements. Finally it 
suggests the SMS security future direction for generating extra research topics. 
 
Key words: Short message service security, short message service cryptography, short message service 
security analysis, mobile communication, mobile public key infrastructure. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of mobile devices has increased rapidly over the 
years, particularly, during the last decade. These wireless 
devices were initially started as devices to store personal 
information. Short message service (SMS) will play an 
important role in the future business areas, which are 
popularly known as m-commerce, mobile banking, 
governmental use, and daily life communication. 
Furthermore, SMS has become a popular wireless service 
throughout the world as it facilitates a user to be in touch 
with any mobile phone subscriber anywhere in the world, 
instantaneously and without any hassle (Grillo et al., 
2008; Zhang et al., 2005). 
 
 
MOTIVATION 
 
The primary purpose of SMS is to deliver  text  messages 
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from one mobile device to another. It provides many 
benefits to our everyday life. However, it is considered 
safe and secure when sensitive information is transmitted 
using the typical SMS services?, many possible threads 
of SMS can arise, hence, it is important to prevent the 
SMS content from being illegally intercepted/interrupted 
by illegal sources as well as to ensure the origin of the 
message from the legitimate sender (Hossain et al., 
2008).  
One of the important challenges in the mobile com-
munication industry is to ensure the mobile services are 
properly used and not open to abuse (Al-Fayoumi et al., 
2007; Hwu et al., 2006). Additionally, unencrypted SMS 
content during the transmission allows the mobile 
operator’s employee to read and modify the SMS 
content. Unfortunately, the SMS does not have any built-
in vetting procedure to authenticate the text or provide 
security for the data/text transmitted (Hossain et al., 
2008). It is obvious that parts of the SMS applications for 
mobile devices are designed and developed without 
taking into account the SMS security aspects.  Therefore,  
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all SMS facilities should incorporate some form of basic 
security mechanism in terms of confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation of the messages 
before it can deemed suitable for use by the government, 
commercial and military services (Garza-Saldana and 
Daz-Pérez, 2008; Hassinen, 2005; Hassinen and 
Markovski, 2003). 
Exchanging normal SMS does not guarantee the 
confidentiality as it is not totally secure and reliable since 
the messages are transferred in a text-mode (readable) 
through an insecure transmitting channel. Due to the 
special nature of the mobile communications and the lack 
of security of the transmitting channel, achieving the 
security issues can be considered as a high priority issue. 
Beside improving and enhancing the secret of the SMS 
content without being unlawfully tempered (Wu and Tan 
2009; Zhang et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2008). In simple 
term, the unprotected communication channels and the 
increasing popularity of the wireless devices pose serious 
security vulnerabilities. Thus, it is important that both the 
mobile applications developer and the mobile service 
providers (mobile operator) ensure the correct identities 
of the communicating parties, while at the same time, 
ensure SMS content confidentiality and integrity during 
data transmission period in order to avoid these threats 
(Tiejun et al., 2008). The aim of this review paper is to 
provide useful advices for further research in the SMS 
security topic, which is considered one of the important 
topics since the SMS is part of our daily life, beside, 
many research centers around the world trying to 
improve it by using different techniques and security 
framework. 
The main objectives of this paper are: 
 
i) To explain SMS transmission steps and indicates the 
main components of GSM which are participating during 
the SMS transmission. 
ii) To review all the current SMS security aspects and 
concerns during the SMS transmission. 
iii) To present chronologically the existing mechanisms 
used to protect the SMS transmission. 
iv) To analyze the security mechanism base on the 
mobile security requirements and mobile performance 
capability.  
v) To suggests future direction for generating extra 
research topics in improving the SMS security. 
 
 
Paper layout 
 
This paper presents an overview of the current SMS 
security, presented in terms of the main challenges and 
techniques. These techniques are described historically 
and in a particular order. Outlines of the SMS main 
structure of SMS transmission operations that SMS 
should be followed between the communications 
partners, describing the SMS security concerns in every 
single point of the transmission framework as background  
 
 
 
 
needed in order to present the solutions, analysing all the 
SMS security techniques that can be used to protect 
SMS content, analysing the security requirements against 
mobile performance, future key challenges and offering 
our view in the SMS security future direction of SMS 
security and finally summarises the state of the SMS 
security are all given in the study. 
 
 
SMS operations 
 
Before talking about the security concerns during the 
SMS transmission, it is better to give details of the steps 
during the SMS content exchange. It looks easy 
conceptually to understand the normal mobile to mobile 
SMS transmission in general, but it is highly complex to 
implement the protocols and the mechanisms which 
precede with the transmission procedures. The SMS 
messages can go through in both directions, thus, when 
a message is sent from a mobile device to another 
mobile device, it goes through several procedures before 
it is delivered. The next figure in this study presents a 
short overview of the message pathway. There are two 
types of pathways for the SMS transmission between 
different mobile subscribers. 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Internal exchange 
 
When two mobiles subscribers intend to exchange the 
SMS and both subscribers belong to one mobile operator 
company. 
 
 
Case 2  
 
External exchange 
 
When two mobile subscribers intend to exchange the 
SMS and both belong to different mobile operators 
(Lockefeer et al., 2010). Figure 1 illustrates the mobile 
network infrastructure and the sequences steps when 
exchanging the SMS content between two mobile 
subscribers (Case 1). 
All the details related to Figure 1 will be tabulated in 
Table 1. Figure 2 illustrate the steps as a sequence flow 
of exchanging SMS between different mobile operator 
companies (Case 2). In this case the SMS should go 
through two SMS centres (SMSC). All the details related 
to the Figure 2 is fully tabulated in Table 2. It is clear that, 
there are two main layers participting in the sending and 
receiving of the SMS between different mobile sub-
scribers. Normally, the SMS is sent (composes) through 
the application layer and then it goes through the 
transport layer (transmission medium) before arriving at 
the mobile destination through the application layer again 
(inbox). Thus, the security is  mainly  concerned  with  the 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Internal SMS transmssion steps. 
  
 
 
application and transport layers during the SMS 
transmission. Figure 3 presents a general overview of the 
SMS transmission layers (application and trasport 
layers). 
 
 
SMS security concern 
 
It is a well-known that the GSM Network cannot provide 
several important security services simultaneously (Kolsi, 
2004). Thus, it is common for this feature to be exposed 
to some security risks during SMS contents transmission. 
Many encryptions standards used by mobile’s operator to 
ensure the integrity and confidentially of transmitted 
content. Therefore, security in cellular telecommunication 
framework is important to secure safe communication 
and signaling data from interception as well as to prevent 
the cellular telephone scheme from various electronic 
interferences and threats (Islam and Ajmal, 2009; 
Margrave, 2000; Meyer and Wetzel, 2004a, b). Further-
more, as the integrity and confidentiality can be achieve 
by encrypting the medium, and the authenticity can be 
executed by installing a backend server for the authen-
tication purpose to verify the authenticity of the user who 
is in ownership of the mobile device (Croft and Olivier, 
2005; Guthery et al., 2000; Lo et al., 2008; Steiner et al., 
1988), the authentication server is connected to the SMS 
centre (SMSC) as all the messages go through the SMS 
centers. Figure 4 illustrates the steps of authenticating 
the mobile devices (sender and  receiver). All  the  details 
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related to the Figure 4 are fully tabulated in Table 3. 
Although the GSM network applies different security 
techniques, openness of the wireless transmission makes 
the communicating parties vulnerable to information 
interruption/interception by hateful attackers (Margrave, 
2000; Meyer and Wetzel, 2004a, b; Toorani and Beheshti, 
2008). 
The medium of SMS content transmission is not 
completely secure and vulnerable to malicious attackers 
who could use it to monitor and send wrong information 
between the communicating parties, thus, the GSM 
network suffers from various security weaknesses. This 
allows an attacker with the right tools and mechanisms to 
modify/read on the information that is being sent 
(Hassinen and Markovski, 2003; Hossain et al., 2008; 
Pesonen, 1999; Quirke, 2004). Furthermore, it is well-
known that, it is possible to a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack in GSM during authentication which allows an 
attacker to choose a mobile victim device or station 
authenticates itself to a fake base station which in turn 
forwards the authentication traffic to the real network, 
thus impersonating the victim mobile station to a real 
network and vice versa (Asokan et al., 2005). It is 
obvious that there are several security concerns and risks 
during the SMS broadcast or transmission operations. It 
can be defined that there are two types of network 
concerns which can happen on the transport layer 
(transmission medium) and the application concern 
(composing and saving the SMS content). 
 
i) First section reviews the SMS security concern during 
network infrastructural components.  
ii) Second section reviews the SMS security concerns 
during the application layer (sending and receiving). 
 
 
Transport layer network medium 
 
The SMS content transmits through various protocols and 
interfaces. Despite the various security measures being 
taken. GSM with the worldwide users suffer from several 
security limitations (Siddique et al., 2006) and, therefore, 
it can be considered that there is no security provided for 
the SMS end-to-end transmission, that means there are 
no evidence that SMS transmission circle (from source to 
destination) can be secure (Lockefeer et al., 2010). Table 
4 analyses the important SMS security concern on 
different points (during GSM components) which can 
affect the security of the SMS message during the trans-
port layer, as well as (the third column of the Table 4) 
presenting the concern descriptions for specific positions 
in Figures 1 to 4. 
 
 
Application layer 
 
Although there are some application layer protocols that 
simultaneously    provide    the   confidentiality,   integrity,  
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Table 1. Description of internal excahnge process. 
 
Steps Description 
1 
Mobile devices composes and sends the SMS to the nearest base station (BS) using on- the-air (OTA) interface, which is 
the standard for the transmission and reception of application-related information in wireless communications devices 
(Koien and Haslestad, 2003; Pitoura et al., 1998). 
  
2 The BS forwards the SMS content to the mobile’s home short message service centre (SMSC), over SS7 (Glitho, 1997). 
  
3 After completing its internal processing, and interrogation of the destination location, the SMSC sends the message over SS7 to the nearest BS around the final mobile destination (Glitho, 1997; Wilson, 1992). 
  
4 Through the OTA protocol again the BS station forwards the SMS to the final Mobile reception and then the Delivery 
acknowledgements will follow the reverse path. 
 
Note: all the steps mentioned in Figure 1 are in the form of numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. External SMS transmssion steps. 
 
 
 
authentication, and non-repudiation processes, however, 
several possible attacks to this main security measure 
can arise (Toorani et al., 2008). In particular, there are 
concerns about the built-in nature of the SMS service that 
seems not in a position to discourage companies to 
consider the SMS as an effective means of exchanging 
the business records (Grillo et al., 2008). Table 5 reviews 
the important concern’s types, that can affect the SMS 
messages during the application layer, and description is 
provided in second column for the concerned location by 
mentioning the specific location in Figures 1 to 4. 
 
 
SMS security techniques 
 
Unprotected communication channels pose serious 
security vulnerabilities. Thus, it is importantly pertinent 
that both the mobile applications and the mobile 
operators must apply some reliable protective techniques 
to avoid these assailable vulnerabilities. This used to 
protect the mobile subscribers from the undesirable 
communication attacks during the SMS transmission. It 
can be provided in the network base (transport layer) or 
in the application base (mobile application) (Tiejun et al., 
2008). This section reviews and describes the security 
mechanisms used for protecting the SMS transmission 
besides analyzing this mechanisms based on the security 
requirements comparing with the mobile performance 
capability. Beside, describes on how this mechanism can 
be applied to avoid the security concerns. There are two 
types of techniques that can be applied in different ways 
as mentioned (application layer and network layer). This 
paper focuses on the application layer techniques, which 
are considered as the current SMS research issues since 
it is under the researchers’ control and development. 
 
 
Applications techniques 
 
Application base means design and development of 
application in the mobile devices to secure the SMS 
content transmission. It considers one of the ways to 
protect the SMS privacy by encrypting the message body 
at the initial transmitter (sender) and then  decrypting  the  
Medani et al.          1151 
 
 
 
Table 2. Description of external excahnge process. 
 
Step Description 
1 Similar to step 1 in Table 1. 
  
2 Similar to step 2 in Table 1. 
  
3 
The sender’s SMSC reformats the SMS message to the short Message Peer to Peer Protocol 
(SMPP) format and then sends it to the SMS gateway using TCP/IP over the public or private 
internet which links to the mobile recipient’s SMSC. The SMPP is the telecommunication’s 
industry protocol for exchanging SMS messages between SMS centres (Aziz, 2006). 
  
4 Similar to step 3 in Table 1. 
  
5 Similar to step 4 in Table 1. 
 
All the steps mentioned in Figure 2 are in the form of numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Transmission layers. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mobile device Authentication process.  
 
 
 
message at the receiving device (receiver). It called an 
end-to-end secure transmission. Of course, the needs for 
developing an end-to-end security mechanisms (including 
integrity, confidentiality, authentication, and non-
repudiation) in the  SMS  services  can  arise  due  to  the 
need of protecting the communication environment (Croft 
and Olivier, 2005; Zhao et al., 2008). It gives the 
opportunity for the developers to design and develop the 
security mechanisms in the mobile devices which it can 
relieve the mobile network provider from the responsibility 
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Table 3. Mobile devices authenticating steps. 
 
Step Description 
1 Mobile device sends the SMS message to the BS via the OTA interface. 
  
2 The mobile switching centre, MSC, routes the SMS between the BSs until the SMS reaches the SMS centre, SMSC, via the SS7 channels. 
  
3 The SMSC forwards the SMS to the authentication server through the TCP/IP connection for verifying the SMS’s sender. 
  
4 The authentication server sends an acknowledgment back to the SMSC which then enquires the home location registration (HLR) to determine the mobile target location among the mobile network. 
 
Note: all the steps mentioned in figure 4 are indicated in numbers.  
 
 
 
of protecting the information during the transmission 
process (De Paula et al., 2005). In simple term, 
developing a security application in the SMS market is a 
critical aspect of the software development from the 
software engineering view, since (Nah et al., 2005) 
proved that the value of the mobile applications begins to 
assume serious inter-related highly confidential matters 
and that as a result there are predominantly urgent needs 
to protect the electronic transmission of data. Further-
more as application techniques are independent from the 
mobile operator sphere of activity, it can also reduce the 
security overhead. 
Safe mobile application structure or framework should 
provide different safety features and requirements. Figure 
5 shows the main application or framework requirements 
(Lam et al., 2003). As is already known, the SMS 
provides a connectionless transfer of messages. A single 
message consists of 140 bytes and there is a unique 
SMS format or structure for the GSM network. Figure 6 
illustrates the SMS header and the payload - SMS 
content- where the security mechanisms should be 
applied for the text inside the payload which contains the 
sensitive information. In the modern technology, crypto-
graphy provides powerful tools for protecting sensitive 
communications over a public network, but it imposes an 
overhead in terms of additional computation (Grillo et al., 
2008). There are three types of crypto-graphic schemes, 
namely: i) secret key (or symmetric) cryptography, ii) 
public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography; and, iii) hash 
functions. Figure 7 demonstrates the end-to-end secure 
SMS transmission during the communication medium. It 
is clear that when the SMS message is locked (encrypt) 
at the sender side, only the receiver can unlock (decrypt) 
the SMS content. Thus, the message will be encrypted 
during all the transmission media. 
Security techniques can be applied to the payload field 
in the SMS headers (Figure 6). Therefore, there are 
special packages that can be used to get access to the 
SMS header’s field. WMA is used as an optional package 
for the J2ME that enables an application developer to a 
system that can send and receive  an  SMS  (Messaging, 
2002). Figure 8 illustrates the components within the 
WMA package. It is used for building the SMS appli-
cations. This package is now widely used and it is the 
main package used during the SMS transmission. The 
aforementioned components have different tasks as by 
combining them they can send and receive the SMS 
messages. Unfortunately, none of these components 
include any encryption mechanism to protect the 
confidentiality content of a SMS message during its 
transmission between the sender and the receiver and it 
is for this particular aspect that the security developers 
get a good opportunity to apply their proposed techniques 
for protecting the SMS transmission using the 
cryptography techniques and algorithms. 
Several cryptography techniques used to overcome the 
SMS security problems and fulfill the security require-
ments. Although cryptography provides powerful tools for 
protecting sensitive communications over a public 
network, it imposes an overhead in terms of additional 
computational processes: this limitation can threaten the 
usability of the embedded devices (for example smart 
phones) with severe constraints on the computational 
power, battery life and user latency which impose limits 
on the amount of encryption operations that can be 
performed without a severe degradation of the device. 
Therefore, the right choice of the suitable mechanisms is 
highly and crucially important (Grillo et al., 2008). 
 
 
Symmetric cryptography 
 
The first technique used for protecting the SMS 
application is the type of encryption which provides an 
end-to-end security mechanism and is considered a high-
quality solution for the SMS protection since the mobile 
device has limited resources, such as, insufficient 
memory, inadequate processing power and limited power 
supply (Lu et al., 2002; Nicholson et al., 2006). It 
represents a shared secret key between two or more 
communication parties that can be used to protect the 
SMS   content.  However,  safe  key  distribution  is  quite 
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Table 4. SMS transmission concenrs. 
 
Concern location Figure location Concern description  
OTA interface Figure 1 step 1 
and 4. 
Although the GSM standard is considered to be secure, beside it has a strong 
subscriber authentication and over the air (OTA) transmission encryption, but it 
depends on the countries policies and approval. Therefore, applying the new 
security mechanism can be difficult, which can generate SMS security risks as 
the (Croft and Olivier, 2005; Lo et al., 2008; Schneier, 2005). 
   
OTA interface Figure 1 step 1 
and 4. 
Choice of the type of encryption in a network should be specific. A5/1 and A5/2 
are mostly used for the security of the OTA interface but they are not totally safe 
because they are based on the stream cipher and several serious weaknesses 
and limitations in the cipher have been recognized (Biryukov et al., 2001; Ekdahl 
et al., 2001; Lo et al., 2008). 
   
SS7 channel 
Figure 2 step 2. 
All call setups, roaming, teardown messages, and database queries controlled 
by SS7, thus, It becomes the attackers’ most important target. It is built for 
supporting the transportation and the SMS transmission through the core 
Network. Although the SS7 channel is already protected, it is still suffer from the 
lack of permissions for develop new mechanisms, because it considered under 
the SMS administration, management and control. Beside the SMS content can 
be read by the mobile operator workers during SS7 duration which is on the 
routing path between the message sender and the SMSC (Bais et al., 2006; 
Biryukov et al., 2001; Kawamoto and Nakamura, 2002; Lo et al., 2008; Moore et 
al., 2002; Sengar et al., 2005). 
Figure 3 step 3. 
   
SMS center SMSC Figure 2 step 3. 
SMS center must provide the secure routing and protect SMS content storage 
with additional security system features. Always SMSCs are protected by a white 
list such as database or table, This list contains of a list of the IP or MAC 
addresses of machines from which a server will accept the connections whilst at 
the same it is supposed to deny all other unrelated connections. However, the 
SMSCs do not have all the requisite security features as will accept connections 
from any machine on the internet which could have been unlawfully added in the 
list by the attackers (Asvial et al., 2004; Le Bodic, 2005). 
   
BSS attackers Figure 1 step 1 
and 4. 
Although the GSM security mechanisms achieved successful result for avoiding 
some SMS security attacks, still there are several weaknesses found when it 
comes to the sensitive SMS applications. There are many GSM interception 
protocols located in a (possibly) closed area that listen to the information 
exchanged between the base stations (BSs) and the mobile stations (MSs) 
(Boman et al., 2002; Gonzalez-Castano et al., 2002; Lockefeer, et al., 2010) 
   
Authentication server (AS) Figure 4 step 3 
and 4. 
The connection between the SMSC and the authentication server is through the 
TCP/IP connection. It is not so easy to protect the transmission process as any 
intermediaries can be the potential attackers. The mobile operators is not 
responsible to protect this transmission process because it is considered to be 
outside its jurisdictional architectures (Lo et al., 2008) . 
 
 
 
difficult (Abomhara et al., 2010). Furthermore, symmetric 
cryptography algorithms cannot provide authentication, 
non-repudiation and the message originality. Figure 9 
illustrates that both the sender and receiver use the same 
key for both the encryption and the decryption operation. 
Dankers et al. (2002) stated that secret key techniques 
were based on the fact of sender and recipient shared a 
secret, which was used for various SMS cryptographic 
operations. It must be exchanged in a separate 
communication way whereby both of  the  communication 
parties should agree before establishing their SMS 
transmission. 
A mobile operator can be used for exchanging the 
secret key by installing that key inside the SIM card. 
However, this type of SMS application is considered 
independent from the mobile infrastructure and the SIM 
card can be easily stolen and the secret key can be 
known by other illegitimate parties, thus, these 
techniques suffer from disparity of the key agreement as 
mentioned.   However,  (Ratshinanga   et  al.,  2004)  had 
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Table 5. SMS application security concenrs. 
 
Concern type Figure location Concern description  
Unencrypted storage Figure 1 Mobile device 
Network attacker can access the data stored inside the mobile SMS inbox. Although the 
communication way may be encrypted, still there are some risks. When the SMS reaches 
the final destination target, the decryption process of the content will clear the passage for 
the recipient reader. Therefore, encrypting the communication way is not enough to 
provide a full end-to–end SMS protection. It should, however, provide some additional 
locking techniques to ensure that the SMS stored inside the mobile device is safe and 
secure (Lo et al., 2008; Lockefeer, et al., 2010). 
   
Identity 
Impersonation 
Figure 1 
Mobile device 
The attacker can inject the SMS messages into the messaging network with falsified 
originator IDs. The attacker can copy the SP for a legitimate mobile user. It is possible to 
send an SMS message from the internet with the correct headers without the recipient 
being able to detect that it comes from the internet. Lacking of authenticating mechanism 
provide good ability to identify impersonation (Zhang et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2008). 
   
Message forgery and 
tampering 
Figure 1 
Mobile device 
An attacker can also forge or tamper the payload field of an SMS packet, namely: 
Chikomo et al. (2006), Ratshinanga et al. (2004) and Zhang et al. (2005). 
   
Eavesdropping Figure 1 
An attacker can get access to the messages transmitted through the current mobile 
networks. Beside, attacker can also intercept the messages from the internet or over the 
air (OTA) and can easily get interesting information since there are no strong protective 
measures applied to them (Lo et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2005). 
   
(MITM) 
 
Figure 1 
Mobile sender 
The man-in-the-middle (MITM) or an intermediary attacker is one of the problems 
encountered in the public key cryptography during an exchange of the public key between 
the communicating parties. The attacker interrupts messages in the middle of its 
transmission and tries to cheat the two communicating parties by posing as a third party. 
(Schwiderski-Grosche and Knospe., 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mobile application requirments. 
 
 
Figure 6. SMS framework. 
  
 
 
presented a protocol to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of the SMS communication as this protocol was 
designed due to the lack of security in the WMA. It was 
based on the symmetric key cryptography or secret key 
cryptography.   Although   its   success  offered  a  perfect  
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Figure 7. End-to-End secure transmssion.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. WMA component. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. SMS symetrric cryptograhy.  
 
 
 
result during the security analysis, it is, however, 
considered as a heavy process because the secret-key 
used to encrypt the  SMS  distribution  and  agreement  is 
based on the asymmetric key encryption process 
between the server and the mobile client. Therefore, the 
shared key cannot exchange openly  without  the  help  of 
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Figure 10. SMS symetrric cryptograhy.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Symmetric vs. asymmetric. 
 
Requirements Symmetric key cryptography Symmetric key cryptography 
Keys for encryption and decryption. Encryption and decryption using one key. 
One key for encryption and a different key 
for decryption. 
   
Speed of encryption and decryption. Very fast. Slower than symmetric key cryptography. 
Size of cipher text. Same as plain text. Bigger than plain text. 
Key distribution. Big problem. No problem. 
   
Number of keys for senders with many 
communication parties. 
Approximately to the square of the 
number of senders. Same of the numbers of the senders. 
  
 
 
other cryptography techniques. A combination of the 
asymmetric cryptography and symmetric cryptography 
can achieve more robust functionalities. It is clear that a 
symmetric key cryptography can be considered a light 
secure technique for exchanging a secure SMS 
application. However, the data security depends on the 
secrecy of the key that is if an attacker can stumble on a 
way to intercept the key, he/she can easily decode the 
encrypted SMS content. Thus, the security of the SMS 
content will be at risk during the key distribution or 
transmission processes (Lison and Drahanský, 2008). 
 
 
Asymmetric cryptography 
 
Several weaknesses pertaining to the key distribution in 
the symmetric key cryptography, thus, a new type of 
encryption method was developed. Diffie and Hellman 
(1976) studied the key agreement problem in the 
symmetric cryptography and resolved the issue by two 
different keys or a key pair in which one key is called the 
private or secret key, and the other is the public key. 
When a sender wants to communicate, the sender has to 
inform or send his public key to the other communicating 
parties to perform the encryption process for the plain 
text. He/she would then use his private key to decrypt the 
message.  
Thus, no one else can decrypt the message except  the  
person who knows the private key. As the public key can 
be distributed openly, unlike the private key, it must be 
kept secret. Using the key pair approach, the key distri-
bution problem has been solved. Figure 10 illustrates that 
both the communicating parties generate two key pairs 
for the cryptography process. As pointed out, the main 
reason for using a public key cryptography is that there is 
some degree of protection during the exchange of the 
encrypted keys in an unprotected medium. However, it is 
not as simple as it seems because if the basic public key 
methods for communication are wrongly used due to 
inexperienced operation, it can eventually be open to 
abuse, and thus, susceptible to the man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks.  
The public key can therefore be considered as the first 
key establishment protocol based on the public key 
cryptography. However, the protocol does not provide 
authentication of the communicating parties which means 
that a man-in-the-middle attack is possible (Forsberg, 
2007). This problem can be resolved by using a third 
trusted party to determine the authenticity of the receiver 
(Anuar et al., 2008; Gutmann, 2004; Wilson, 2005). The 
third trusted party method has been used to solve the key 
exchange authentication problem and it is simply an add-
on to the authentication scheme in the exchange process 
which is called the public key infrastructure (PKI) (Jøsang 
et al., 2007; Jumaat et al., 2008). Table 6 shows the 
comparison   between  the  symmetric  key  cryptography  
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Figure 11. A High level view of registration/communication processes. 
  
 
 
and the asymmetric key cryptography which basically 
based on different parameters. 
 
 
Mobile PKI (M-PKI) 
 
The PKI provides the means to establish trust by binding 
the public keys and identities together to give a 
reasonable assurance that the parties can communicate 
securely with the expected entity (Alanazi et al., 2010). 
Hence, it can be used to prevent the keys from the MITM 
attacker during public key distribution, besides; it also 
provides an end-to-end secure transmission between 
sending and receiving (Gutmann, 2004; Ratshinanga et 
al., 2004). Previously to the present mobile PKI issues 
and techniques should go through these coming sections 
to provide a general idea about the PKI framework. 
Figure 11 shows the Mobile PKI basic framework for 
securing the SMS transmission. Each mobile user 
registers the public key with a trusted party, along with 
the information about that entity over  a  secure  medium. 
Basically, the trusted party is expected to ensure that the 
public key really does belong to the registrant, and all the 
associated data are accurate. If the relevant authority has 
granted the approval, a certificate will be issued and duly 
signed. As long as that mobile user has securely 
obtained the authority's public key, the exchanged 
certificate can be validated by checking on the authority's 
signature. Therefore, the PKI’s main idea is to introduce a 
trusted third party (agent) to be securely involved with all 
the communicating parties (Alanizi et al., 2010; Anuar et 
al., 2008; Hassinen, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, a mobile user has to obtain 
another party’s public key before exchanging the SMS 
message. Figure 12 shows the process of downloading 
the peer certificate from the CA to the user mobile 
application. 
 
i) The mobile device sends an HTTP request to the CA 
enquiring about the peer certificate. 
ii) The CA checks the availability of the requested 
certificate   and   signs  it  before  sending  it  back  to  the  
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Figure 12. PKI certificate downloading. 
  
 
 
mobile user application as an HTTP response. 
iii) The mobile user application verifies the certificate and 
then extracts the public key to be used to secure the 
SMS message via an asymmetric key cryptography 
before saving the certificate in his certificate directory. 
 
After downloading the other parties’ certificate, the mobile 
user can extract the public key and then use it for 
securing the SMS content by applying the cryptography 
algorithms. Secrecy of SMS content can be guaranteed 
as all the security requirements (Anuar et al., 2008; 
Chanson and Cheung, 2001; Hassinen and Markovski, 
2006; Kawamoto and Nakamura, 2002). Figures 13 and 
14 illustrate the PKI operations for exchanging the SMS 
between different communication parties. It is clear that, 
the communication parties must obtain the digital 
certificate before applying the cryptography mechanisms 
for securing the SMS transmission. Implementation of the 
PKI in a mobile communication is the best solution for the 
subsequent decade since the demand for a secure 
mobile SMS becomes increasingly important .This 
because many applications have been built for the mobile 
phones, besides, PKI technology is easy to be under-
stood and accepted among the security environment. 
Table 7 illustrates the PKI solutions for both transmission 
and  application  SMS  security  concerns   as  mentioned 
earlier (Tables 4 and 5). 
Normally, the PKI is successful in the wire and desktop 
applications since they have a high power capability for 
the PKI processes. 
Due to the performance limitations of the existing 
mobile devices capability, it is, thus, considered the PKI 
technology not suitable for the implementation of 
securing the SMS transmission (Beller et al., 1993; 
Chanson and Cheung, 2001; Kuaté et al., 2009; Lee et 
al., 2007; Lin and Harn, 1995; Zheng, 1996). Many pro-
posed solutions based on the PKI mechanism. Table 8 
reviews some of these proposed ideas for implementing 
the mobile PKI mechanism in the mobile area. 
  
 
SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
Several challenges have to be overcomed for wide 
deployment in the mobile systems. These challenges 
include a complexity (difficulty) management of applying 
PKI mechanisms to the limited devices capability during 
the deployment process in the large scale heterogeneous 
mobile system (Seema et al., 2004). As known PKI 
technology is a kind of asymmetric cryptography tech-
niques, which depends on high intensive computationally 
of generating keys,  and  that  makes  them  less  suitable 
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Figure 13. Securing SMS transmission parts. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Securing SMS transmission overview.  
 
 
 
for devices of limited size and processing power, such as, 
mobile phones (Dankers et al., 2002). In simple terms, if 
the mobile user likes to use the  PKI  mechanisms,  these 
should have the full support for the PKI features which 
require a high mobile capability (Cai et al., 2005). Cur-
rently, all the mobile devices  have  limited  computational 
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Table 7. Concerns solution by PKI. 
  
Transport layer concerns 
Concern PKI solution  
All the network concerns 
mentioned in Table 4. 
A public key infrastructure (PKI) provides an end-to-end secure transmission for the SMS content. All 
the intermediary people during the SMS transmission layer cannot read or modify the SMS content as 
it has been encrypted and duly signed by using the keys of the communicating parties. Therefore, the 
SMS content will be encrypted during the OTA, SS7 transmission media, and inside the SMSC and the 
BS. Even the Network employee’s operators cannot read or modify the SMS content. 
 
Application layer concerns 
Concern (Table 5) PKI solution  
Identity impersonation. 
All The SMSs are signed by using the sender’s private key which is unknown to the intermediary 
people including the network operator employees. Furthermore the PKI achieve the necessary of non-
repudiation requirement. 
  
Message forgery and 
tampering. 
In the current PKI application, the message is signed by the sender which means attacker cannot know 
the private key of the sender, thus, attacker cannot tamper with the message neither can generate a 
correct signature. It is easy to verify the integrity of the message. 
  
Eavesdropping. 
An SMS message is encrypted, and only the sender and receiver know the decryption key (distributed 
via the certificate authority). Any attacker will need a great deal of effort (years) if he wants to decode 
the encryption, especially, if a strong encryption algorithm is used. 
  
Unencrypted storage. It can store the SMS inside the mobile inbox as a cipher text and when the user wants to check it, he 
can decrypt it by using his private key. 
  
(MITM). Thus, it can solve the authentication issue on both the communicating parties. The PKI utilizes the X.509 certificate for authenticating the communicating parties. 
  
 
 
capabilities and a limited power supply since they are 
depending on batteries, thus, traditional PKI quite 
unsuitable for these existing devices (Lee et al., 2007). It 
is obvious that, mobile devices must have the high power 
capability to implement the PKI functions, beside owns 
associated capacity. That will provide a huge effort for the 
authentication process, and can lead to a significant 
achievement of higher levels of security. However, due of 
resources in the mobile devices, the PKI implementation 
consider as a serious drawback for the mobile devices 
application. Thus, the relationship between the high 
security requirements and the mobile performance is 
inversely proportional, as the PKI provides a high security 
level for protecting the SMS transmission; however, at 
the same time it decreases the mobile performance. 
Figure 15 shows the inverse proportional relationship. 
Many researchers have been attempting to keep the 
PKI high security requirments, as well as to improve the 
mobile ability for applying PKI functions. Many 
researchers have been attempting to keep the high 
security level achevied by traditional PKI concept, as well 
as protecting the mobile devices from PKI complexity. 
Some reserachers attemped by using combination pro-
cesses by making use of the symmetric key cryptography 
in the PKI to reduce the asymmetric cryptography 
overhead, while others attempted  to  bypass  the  part  of 
the PKI operators to the trusted third party, such as, 
introduction of additional servers or doing away with the 
GSM mobile operators. Furthermore, some researchers 
are thinking of improving the cryptography algorithms and 
use the lowest computational power in the mobile 
application combined with the PKI techniques. Table 9 
shows some alternative methods to reduce the PKI 
complexity. In short, the mobile communications security 
solutions that are based on the PKI rely on the mobile 
phone network operator or service provider as part of the 
proposed solutions. These server architecture solutions 
are implementable for governmental or big commercial 
usage. However, it is un-implementable for individual 
usage. Generally, the server architecture solutions need 
additional hardware (that is servers) as a result of which 
a qualified staff is required to maintain the servers. 
Moreover, the server architecture mobile security 
systems user has to get the mobile network operator or 
the service provider’s approval as it still depends on the 
services of the mobile network operator or the service 
provider. Furthermore, the overhead cost of communi-
cation is increased due to the users’ need to access to 
the servers in many cases, such as, uploading and 
downloading the cryptographic keys. 
Researchers do not expect that the mobile operators 
will provide the security services to  the  transmitted  data
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Table 8. Proposed PKI impelemetation . 
 
Methodology Weaknesses 
Developing a new sever to act as a trusted third 
party or a middleware between the main server and 
the mobile device (Chanson and Cheung, 2001). 
Difficult to develop for practical application because it depends 
on using two SIM cards. 
 
  
Describes a simple symmetric key 
key cryptography and creates a lightweight based 
identity AKE protocol (Forsberg, 2007). 
It is considered as a light protocol because it is based on 
binding the sender and/or the receiver identities to the key 
establishment, as it also needs different communication and 
operation processes with the third trusted server.  
  
Install fixed Internet line because the exiting fixed 
line had already been developed and evaluated 
(Kawamoto and Nakamura, 2002). 
Devices can use only the x.509 standard as it is considered as 
a certificate internet standard and it is heavy for verification in 
the normal mobile standards.  
  
Based on using identify based cryptography and 
other techniques to overcome memory limitation 
(Zhao et al., 2008). 
Has to deal with the mobile server provider and suitable only 
for large commercial organizations. 
  
Using approximated one-time pads (Croft, et al., 
2005). 
Cannot provide a secure communication between two mobile 
devices. 
  
Combined with a structure called Latin square, and 
cryptography processing (Hassinen and Markovski, 
2003). 
Cannot fulfil all the security requirements, such as, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. 
 
  
Encryption generated from the one-time password is 
entered by the user (Chikomo et al., 2006). Cannot provide the end-to-end security requirements. 
  
Shared a secret password between all the 
communicating parties (Hassinen, 2005). 
Sender and receiver must previously have agreed on the 
password and PKI mentioned but not used. 
  
Encrypts the plain text to the cipher text by using the 
existing mobile network to achieve the confidentiality 
and then signed before sending it to the receiver 
(Hossain et al., 2008). 
Mobile devices have to be compatible with the GSM mobile 
service provider’s network because it provides an encryption 
scheme. 
  
Uses 10 functions or steps to achieve a reliably total 
security (Harb et al., 2008). 
The system uses a symmetric key cryptography which has a 
key distribution problem and does not provide an end-to-end 
security between the two devices. 
  
Using PKI technology (Jumaat et al., 2008). 
The mobile device must download the certificate from the M-
PKI directly and then stores the certificate inside the mobile 
device to perform the verification process which incurs high 
power consumption besides having a memory limitation 
problem. 
  
Using PKI for exchanging the secret key (Toorani et 
al., 2008). 
Although the public key is used for generating the secret key to 
reduce the public key complexity, it still needs the SMSC to 
apply some security techniques. 
 
 
 
through the SMS service for individuals, at least not in the 
near future. Additionally, in the current mobile systems, 
some applications based on the PKI have already been 
installed. They can satisfy the security requirements 
through the use of the X.509 as the certificate  standards. 
Although the mobile PKI fulfills all the security require-
ments, it is still unsuccessful to provide heterogeneous 
PKI standards for other mobile devices (Leung et al., 
2003). Furthermore, different certificate standards from 
different   Certificate   Authorities   (CA),   (vendors),   are 
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Figure 15. Protecting the SMS transmission. 
  
 
 
Table 9. Alternative proposed PKI Impelemetation. 
 
Alternative ways Description 
GSM dependency 
Using the existing A8 and A5 algorithms with all the parameters required for this encryption to be 
provided as per GSM specification (Hossain et al., 2008). 
Encryption and signing functions can be done by the crypto co-processor on-board of the PK-SIM card 
(Chanson and Cheung 2001). 
Choice of short number (unique number for mobile message service) for applying the encryption process 
(Zhao, et al., 2008). 
  
Third party 
A structure called Latin square had been use for applying cryptography processing (Hassinen 
and Markovski, 2003). 
Using the user authentication server (UAS) to act as a trusted third Party to assist the mobile client during 
authenticating and exchanging the keys (Chanson and Cheung, 2001). 
Using the current internet line as way for authenticating the communication parties (Kawamoto and 
Nakamura, 2002). 
One-time password entered by the user seems like using symmetric cryptography (Chikomo et 
al., 2006). 
Using the secret share techniques for applying the cryptography processes (Harb et al., 2008). 
Using share secret password between the communicating parties as encryption and decryption key 
(Hassinen, 2005). 
Using the secret key for encrypting the SMS during and between the communication parties. The SMS 
centre must provide time stamp during the transmission (Toorani et al., 2008). 
Using the symmetric key for encryption of the SMS message but exchange that symmetric key by using 
the IBC (Forsberg, 2007). 
  
Cryptography  
Algorithm  
Using Elliptic Curve algorithm which requires certain considerations that are not taken into account in the 
traditional public key infrastructures, such as, the key length generation, signature size, memory usage, 
and the required processing. It enhances the speed and leads to an efficient use of power, bandwidth and 
storage which are the basic limitations of resource-constrained devices (Soram, 2009; Toorani et al., 
2008). 
Using elliptic curve algorithm for generation, signing and verification functions are considered as using 
high power consumption for the mobile devices in the PKI implementations. Besides it also provides a 
higher level of security and increased performance in the mobile devices as compared to the RSA (Tillich 
and Grossschaedl., 2004; Hankerson et al., 2004; Malhotra et al., 2007). 
Using the NTRU at the similar security level, the key size of the NTRU is less than a quarter of that of the 
RSA and the speed of the NTRU is much faster than that of RSA; where the key generation is more than 
200 times faster, the encryption is 3 times faster and the decryption is about 30 times faster. These are 
not so widely used because they are new algorithms. Although the operation is much faster, the cipher 
size is huge as compared to the other algorithms (Xiaoyu et al., 2009). 
 
Note: It can be used to resolve more than one alternative way at the same time to reduce the Mobile PKI limitation.  
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Figure 16. Securing SMS transmission. 
  
 
 
considered as overheads for the mobile applications. 
Therefore, mobile applications have to proceed with 
different verification processing functions for different PKI 
certificate standards. In addition, any modification on the 
server side must also be made applicable to the user’s 
mobile application. For example, changing or upgrading 
the certificate standards means upgrading of the mobile 
application process. Thus, the mobile application has to 
deal with any new certificate standards, as the current 
PKI cannot maintain integrity between the standards.  
 
 
LIMITATION 
 
Although this review paper details all security concerns of 
GSM systems and mobile devices during the SMS 
transmission, but it does not mention the techniques 
which could be used to secure GSM architecture. This is 
because we have already introduced the security 
techniques in application layer to provide end to end 
security and protection. 
FUTURE DIRECTION 
 
Presently, there are two directions for enhancing the PKI 
limitations, such as, a high power capability demand as 
mentioned earlier. Firstly, install the middleware server 
(with suitable requirement) between the mobile devices 
and the PKI server. This middleware can shield the 
mobile devices from the PKI complexities and precedes 
some on the PKI mobile operation on behalf of the 
mobile, such as, verifying and storing the mobile 
certificate to reduce the mobile power consumption. The 
XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) can be the 
main structure for that middleware (Inc, 2002; 
Kangasharju et al., 2005; Nguyen and Ivar, 2008; 
Weerasinghe et al., 2006). The XKMS can be a good 
solution for the client’s (mobile device) deployment 
limitation and resolving different vendor’s problem in the 
mobile PKI M-PKI implementation for the security of the 
end-to-end SMS transmission. Figure 16 demonstrates 
the installation of the middleware server base on the 
XKMS technology. Secondly, provide or create a direct  
1164            Sci. Res. Essays 
 
 
 
communication (No certificate authority) between the 
mobile devices can be also a solution, as we have 
mentioned that the main duty of the certificate authority is 
authenticating the communication user, therefore, the 
main challenge is how we can ensure the authentication 
(Al-bakri et al., 2010). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
SMS is an integral part of mobile communication and 
SMS security is undoubtedly useful and interesting but 
yet a challenging issue to consider. It holds great 
potential in applications related to businesses, govern-
ment bodies as well as in military. This paper reviews the 
SMS security by outlining the different security issues 
related to SMS systems and the mechanisms used to 
overcome these issues during the entire SMS 
transmission circle from the mobile source to the final 
mobile destination. Based on the author’s experience, it 
is apparent that PKI provides high level security to protect 
SMS during transmission because it resolve and avoids 
most of the issues related to SMS security. However, it 
decreases the mobile performance as it requires high 
mobile power capability to apply the PKI process. 
Alternative methods should be offered to improve the 
mobile PKI usage in a mobile environment.  
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